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Animal, Vegetable, Mineral-Wind? The Severed

Wind Power Rights Conundrum
K.K. DuVivier*

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States's reliance on fossil fuel sources of energy has put
our country in a bind. Our heavy dependence on oil has subjected us to
price gouging by unfriendly suppliers1 and has compromised our national security.2 While some have argued that the United States should
"drill itself out" of the crisis, 3 most experts agree that this solution is
unworkable. Domestic reserves could not begin to meet our current
demand,4 and the world oil supply is projected to peak and decline
within two to seventeen years.5
The solution lies in aggressively developing a combination of alternatives to oil. 6 While the United States is blessed with abundant reserves of coal,7 this solution is problematic, primarily because of the sig* Associate Professor and Director of the Environmental & Natural Resources Law Program,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank Fred Cheever, Bruce Kramer,
John Lacy, Phillip Lear, Sara C. Bronin, and Jacqueline Weaver for their substantive contributions to
this article. I would also like to thank Adam Duerr, Courtney Radtke, Katie Stevens, and Diane
Burkhardt for their invaluable research help.
1. See, e.g., Steven Mufson, As Gas Pices Rise Again, Democrats Blame Big Oil, WASH.
POST, May 11, 2007, at D1 (describing frustration over rising gas prices and the need for legislation
penalizing price gouging).
2. See, e.g., Rising Oil Prices,DecliningNationalSecurity?: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 50 (2008) (statement of Rep. Joe Wilson, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (stressing that our national security is tied to our energy resources).
3. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, PartiesSplit on How to Expand Offshore Drilling,N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2008, at C1 (discussing the different strategies for improving domestic oil supplies to help
lower gas prices).
4. See, e.g., Drilling for Answers: Oil Company Profits, Runaway Prices and the Pursuit of
Alternatives: Hearing Before Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th
Cong. (2008) (opening statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Select Comm. on Energy
Independence and Global Warming); see also Oil Shock - Potentialfor Crisis: HearingBefore Select
Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong. (2007) (opening statement of
Rep. Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming)
(noting that the United States contains less than 3% of the world's oil reserves, but is itself the
world's largest oil consumer and importer).
5. See, e.g., Robert L. Hirsch, The InevitablePeakingof World Oil Production,16 ATLANTIC
COUNCIL BULL. No. 3, at 9 (Oct. 2005) (suggesting that world oil production will likely peak and decline between 2010 and 2025).
6. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON GLOBAL OIL & NATURAL GAS, SEC'Y OF ENERGY, HARD
TRUTHS: FACING THE HARD TRUTHS ABOUT ENERGY 242-43 (Nat'l Petroleum Council ed., 2007)
(recommending that the United States diversify long-term energy production in order to prepare for
the worldwide energy crisis).
7. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Coal http:/lwww.epa.gov/cleanenergylenergy-and-you/affect/coal.
html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (reporting that "coal consumption in 2003 was just over 1.1 billion
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nificant air pollution from burning coal.8 Methane, or natural gas, is
also somewhat promising, but it emits carbon dioxide and is a limited
and depletable resource. 9 Likewise, the turn to biofuels, especially corn
ethanol, as a renewable solution creates new problems because processing it produces significant amounts of water pollution, 10 burning it still
results in carbon dioxide emissions," and using corn2 for fuel instead of
1
food may be contributing to a world grain shortage.
Driven not only by the current energy crisis,' 3 but also by prescient
citizen initiatives and legislatures that have mandated alternative energy
sources through renewable energy portfolio standard(s) (RPS), 4 many
utilities are now turning to "clean" fuel sources. But leaping to alternative energy sources can also cause unanticipated consequences. For example, the expansion of nuclear fission as a clean alternative energy
source may be delayed by public fear of anything "radioactive" and the
immutable problems of waste disposal. 15
One alternative energy source-wind power-seems to have all of
the advantages. Although it is intermittent, it is renewable. It uses little
water and does not produce any waste. 6 Unlike some fuelsspecifically oil, methane, coal, and ethanol-wind does not emit any
carbon dioxide in producing electricity. With these advantages, plus the
availability of cost-effective technology 7 and significant "reserves" of
tons[,]" with reserves standing at 268 billion tons).
8. Id. (reporting that burning coal results in the emission of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxide, and mercury compounds).
9. New techniques have increased global supplies of natural gas significantly. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, New Way to Tap Gas May Expand Global Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at Al,

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/10/business/energy-environment/lOgas.html?-r=1&th=.
While natural gas may emit fewer greenhouse gases than oil or coal, it still emits C02 and is at best a

"bridge fuel" while renewable energy sources are developed.
10. See, e.g., THE NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., REPORT IN BRIEF:
WATER IMPLICATIONS OF BIOFUELS PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2008) (discussing how

shifting agricultural practices to incorporate more biofuel crops will result in water pollution).
11. See, e.g., Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplandsfor Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCI. 1238, 1238-40 (2008) (finding that
corn-based ethanol may nearly double greenhouse gas emissions over 30 years).
12. See, e.g., C. Ford Runge & Benjamin Senauer, How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor, 86
FOREIGN AFF. 41, 42-43 (2007) (arguing that biofuels could have devastating implications for global
poverty and food security); Christine Spolar, Fuel a Factor at UN Food Talks; As World's Leaders
Tackle Crisis, U.S. Ethanol Policy Hit,CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2008, at C15 (discussing the debate over
diverting grains to produce biofuels in the world's most developed countries).
13. Former Vice President Al Gore has called for the generation of all U.S. electricity by renewable sources within 10 years. Al Gore, Address at Constitution Hall in Washington on Behalf of
WeCanSolvelt.org: A Generational Challenge to Repower America (July 17, 2008), available at

http://ww.wecansolveit.org/pages/al-gore-a-generational-challenge-to-repower-america/.
14. See, e.g., Peter Slevin, Renewable Power's Growth in Colorado PresagesNationalDebate,
WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2008, at A01.
15. See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, NuclearFutures,15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 221, 230-32
(2005) (stating that the disposal of nuclear waste is a contemporary concern with regard to nuclear
energy); see also GWYNETH CRAVENS, POWER TO SAVE THE WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT

NUCLEAR ENERGY (2008) (exploring the history of nuclear issues).
16. See, e.g., Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America's Energy Future: The Future of Renewable WindPower,26 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 505,524 (2008).
17. U.S. Dep't. of Energy, Distributed Energy Program: Wind Power, http://www.eere.energy.
gov/delwind-power.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (stating that wind power produces no emissions

2009]

The Severed Wind Power Rj'ghts Conundrum

wind in the United States,1 8 it is not surprising19that wind power is one of
the fastest growing renewable energy sources.
Animal, vegetable, mineral? Under the traditional classification,
wind would most logically fall into the category of mineral. But why
does the status of wind rights matter? The rapid growth of wind power
has created unanticipated legal problems. Attorneys and landowners
have assumed that the mineral model-deeding wind rights separately
from the surface estate just like other mineral substances-is the most
appropriate.
Commentators and courts have applied the mineral severance concept to the wind context, recognizing the practice of some landowners to
grant or reserve wind rights separate from the surface estate. 20 This
practice could be viewed as a logical extension of the legal practices
found in comparable mineral development-wind power has become a
marketable commodity much like oil, gas, water, or hard minerals. Yet,
how the wind right is categorized will have significant impacts on relations between wind-rights owners and surface owners for centuries to
come.
This article begins with a brief history of wind as a power source.
Part III addresses the evolution of the severed-estates concept to provide a background for Part IV, which explores the only two cases in the
country that have classified wind power as comparable to mineral rights

and is affordable technology).
18. T. Boone Pickens says the "United States is the Saudi Arabia of wind power." PickensPlan.com, The Plan, http://www.pickensplan.com/pdf/ThePlan_0710__Ol.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,

2009).
19. U.S. Dep't of Energy, supranote 17 (stating that wind power is the fastest growing source of
energy in the world since 1990).
20. See, e.g., Lisa Chavarria, The Severance of Wind Rights in Texas, University of Texas
School of Law's Wind Energy Institute, 2 (January 2009) [hereinafter Severance]; Lisa Chavarria,
Undertaking the Severance of Wind Rights, STATE BAR OF TEXAS: OIL, GAS AND ENERGY RES. L.
SEC. REP., VOL. 32 No. 2, Dec. 2007, at 1-5 [hereinafter Undertaking]; Lisa Chavarria, Wind Power.ProspectiveIssues, 68 TEX. B. J. 832, 834-35 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Wind Powei] (stating that Chavarria does not support or oppose the practice of severance but recognizes that it is common among
Texas landowners); Terry E. Hogwood, Against the Wind, STATE BAR OF TEX.: OIL, GAS AND
ENERGY RES. L. SEC. REP., Vol. 26 No. 2, Dec. 2004, at 6-8; Ernest Smith, Wind Energy: Siting Controversies and Rights in Wind, I ENVTL & ENERGY L. & POL'Y 281, 301 (2007) ("Wind does not
share the physical characteristics of solid minerals or of water. It can hardly be deemed part of the
fee simple or owned 'in place' by a landowner."). Although Smith does not cite the adcoelum doctrine, he does cite Hogwood to say wind ownership may be comparable to the "capture" theory used
for wild animals or the law of percolating water and Contra Costa for noting that states may alternatively "look to oil and gas law for an analogy." Id. at 300-03 nn.116, 117, 131-32; Joseph 0. Wilson,
The Answer, My Friends,Is in the Wind Rights Contract Act: Proposed Legislation Governing Wind
Rights Contracts, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1784 (2004). For other valuable articles addressing wind
rights, without as much emphasis on the categorization of the right, see Helle Tegner Anker, Birgitte
Egelund Olsen, & Anita Ronne, Wind Energy and the Law- A ComparativeAnalysis, 27 J. ENERGY
& NAT. RESOURCES L. 145 (2009); Elizabeth Burleson, Wind Power, NationalSecurity, and Sound
Energy Policy,17 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (2009); Bent Ole & Gram Mortenson, International
Experiences of Wind Energy, 2 ENVTL & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 179 (2008); K. Shawn Smallwood,
Wind PowerCompany Compliance with Mitigation Plans in the Altamont Pass Wind Resource Area,
2 ENVTL & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 229 (2008); Roderick E. Wetsel & H. Alan Carmichael, Current
Issues in WindEnergy Law2009,U. Tx. Wind Energy Inst. (Jan. 21-22,2009).
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and the problems raised by these classifications.

II. THE HISTORY OF WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT
The use of wind as a power source has ancient origins. As early as
3,000 B.C.E., humans harnessed the wind to sail boats up the Nile
River.21 Recognizing the potential of wind power, the Chinese are credited as being the first to erect land-based windmills to pump water
around 200 B.C.E.22 Next, the Persians automated the task of grinding
grain with vertical-axis windmills between 500 and 900 A.D. 23 Historians believe that merchants and Crusaders brought the concept from the
Middle East to Europe where windmills became widely accepted.2 4 The
Dutch are credited with refining the tower windmill in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and using it to drain lakes, marshes, and even the
sea.

25

' 26
Windmills were "the 'electrical motor' of pre-industrial Europe.
Yet, wind power is not constant, so during the Industrial Revolution the
steam engine, and then electricity, were introduced as more reliable energy alternatives. 27 Wind turbines remained prevalent on farms and
ranches in rural portions of the United States until the 1950s when these
areas were connected to the electric power grid through efforts of the
28
Rural Electrification Administration and its successor agencies.
As electricity became the currency for power in most nontransportation engines in the United States, 29 scientists explored the use

21.

ROBERT W. RIGHTER, WIND ENERGY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 6 (1996).

22. Michael C. Barnas, The Answer My Friend,Is Blowing In the Wind- Wind Power- The
Renewable Energy,50 ROCKY MTN.MIN. L. INST. 5-1, 5-5 (2004); U.S. Dep't of Energy, History of
Wind Energy, http://www.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/wind history.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2009). Some dispute that the Chinese first invented the windmill more than 2000 years ago, claiming
the earliest documentation of a Chinese windmill was only about 800 years ago in 1219 A.D. See
Darrell M. Dodge, Illustrated History of Wind Power Development, http://www.telosnet.com/wind
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
23. U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 22; see also RIGHTER, supra note 21, at 7.
24. U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 22.
25. See id; see also Fact Sheet on the Netherlands, http://home-12.tiscali.nl/-sparhawk/facts.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
26. Dodge, supra note 22.
27. See id.
28. See Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-950b (2006) (setting forth the
agency's mandate). Farms and ranches beyond the reach of the power grid were not connected until
the 1950s when the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) and its successor agencies spread the
grid and brought inexpensive electric power to most rural areas in the United States. RIGHTER, supra note 21, at 105; see Dodge, supra note 22 ("Between 1850 and 1970, over six million mostly small
(1 horsepower or less) mechanical output wind machines were installed in the U.S. alone. The primary use was water pumping and the main applications were stock watering and farm home water
needs."); see also RIGHTER, supra note 21, at 28 (noting that many estimations conclude six million
small private windmills operated during the years 1880 and 1930 in the Great Plains and American
West).
29. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PETROLEUM NAVIGATOR, http:l/tonto.
eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-cons-psupdc-nus-mbblpd-a.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (providing
statistics relating to the United States consumption of petroleum products). In 2008, petroleum
products remain the primary currency of power for engines in automobiles, buses, and aircraft. Id.
The United States consumed 20,680 barrels of crude oil and petroleum products per day to fuel its
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30
of wind turbines to generate electricity, starting as early as the 1880s.
Yet, the popularity of using wind to generate electricity "has always
fluctuated with the price of fossil fuels." 31 When fossil fuel prices have
been low, wind power has not been able to compete. However, at times
when the United States has been faced with oil embargoes and calls for
energy independence from foreign oil, the interest in wind power has
gained support and wind generation technologies have made significant
progress. 32 Nevertheless, a lack of steady research and development
funding from the U.S. government 33 and a lack of consistent tax treatwind generators comment by Congress have, until recently, put U.S.
34
petitively behind their European counterparts.
Record high oil prices in the summer of 20083' highlighted the dan-

transportation needs in 2007. Id.
30. See Dodge, supra note 22. One of the first systems, which produced 12 kilowatts, was built
by Charles F. Brush in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1888 and operated for 20 years. Id.One of the largest
wind turbines to be created in the 1940s, producing 1.25 megawatts (MW) of power in winds of about
30 mph, operated at Grandpa's Knob in Vermont for several months during World War II. U.S.
Dep't of Energy, supranote 22. Additional progress on reliable wind turbines was made in the 1920s
when energy was in short supply. RIGHTER, supranote 21, at 82-84.
31. U.S. Dep't of Energy, supranote 22.
32. Id
The wind turbine technology R&D that followed the oil embargoes of the 1970s refined old
ideas and introduced new ways of converting wind energy into useful power. Many of these
approaches have been demonstrated in "wind farms" or wind power plants-groups of turbines that feed electricity into the utility grid-in the United States and Europe.
Id.
33. Barnas, supra note 22, at 5-7 to 5-8.
The 1970s brought a fuel crisis, which led to calls for energy independence from foreign oil.

The federal government, which had effectively stopped the development of wind technology by encouraging the completion of the electric grid two decades before, now encouraged
the development of wind turbine technology through research grants. Wind energy became
public policy. Encouraged by significant funding from the federal Department of Energy,
American researchers once again explored wind technology ...[u]nfortunately for American entrepreneurs, the federal support had come somewhat late. European manufacturers,
often with the support of their governments, continue to develop increasingly larger and
more reliable wind turbines. Meanwhile, Americans, who had been denied effective support through most of the 1980s, focused on smaller, residential-size turbines... [w]hen the
modern era dawned in the 1990s, the European suppliers were ready. Danish machines
quickly proved to be the product of choice in North America. Although the American
wind energy industry has expanded considerably, even today, only one manufacturer of
large wind turbines has permanent assembly facilities in the United States.
Id.
34. See JEFFREY LOGAN & STAN MARK KAPLAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: WIND POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES: TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ISSUES 2-3 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34546.pdf.
From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s the U.S. wind energy stagnated due to low energy
prices and the technology's reputation for high cost and low reliability.... New federal and
state incentives encourage developers to focus on the production of electricity at wind
plants (also known as wind farms) and not just installing the equipment. In 1999, the U.S.
industry began a period of rapid expansion, slowed occasionally by expiring federal incentives. Strong growth continues to this day, but whether that growth will continue if federal
tax incentives expire at the end of 2008, as currently scheduled, is unclear.
Id "Large companies and investment banks now drive most wind power activity compared to the
early days of collaborating scientists, inventors, and entrepreneurs." Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, ANNUAL REPORT ON U.S. WIND POWER INSTALLATION, COST AND PERFORMANCE

TRENDS: 2007 14 (2008)), availableat http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/43025.pdf.
35. InflationData.com, Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table), http://www.inflationdata.com/
inflation/InflationRate/HistoricalOilPricesTable.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (stating that in
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ger of the United States's "addiction to oil."' 36 This habit not only
threatens our economy, but also our national security because the
United States depends heavily on hostile foreign powers for a significant
part of its energy needs. 37 But even before that latest oil crisis, a number of groups pushed for alternative energy sources. In 2004, Coloradoans passed the first citizen initiative requiring the state's public utilities
to comply with an RPS which mandates that 10% of their electricity be
generated from renewable sources by the year 2015.38 Other states followed suit, and currently, more than half 39 have goals or mandates to
encourage utilities to use renewable energy sources.4 °
Increased evidence of climate change impacts from burning fossil
fuels has also added new urgency to the need to develop alternative fuels that do not emit carbon dioxide. 41 Former Vice President Al Gore,
who highlighted this issue in the movie "An Inconvenient Truth," 42 has
now called for the generation of all U.S. electricity by renewable sources
June and July of 2008, oil prices reached a record high of over $125 per barrel).
36. George W. Bush, Address Before Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
42 Weekly Comp. Presidential Docs. 57, 59 (Jan. 23, 2007); see Mike Allen, Bush: 'America is Addicted to Oil, 'TIME, January 31, 2006, availableathttp://www.time.com/time/nationarticle/0,8599,11
54992,00.html.
37. The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased tensions with the entire Middle East
region, which is the number one supplier of U.S. oil. Matthew L. Wald, War and Cheap Oil: A SecondLook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,2007, available athttp:llwww.nytimes.coml2007/01/07/weekinreview/07
basic.html. In September 2008, Venezuela, the fourth largest supplier of oil to the United States, expelled the U.S. ambassador claiming the U.S. government was plotting to overthrow its government.
Rory Carrol, Venezuela: Hugo Chavez Expels US Ambassador Amid Claims of Coup Plot,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/12/venzuela.usa.
Russia occupied portions of Georgia and has threatened to control other former members of the Soviet Union in regions that contain critical oil pipelines supplying 20% of European oil. Jim Heintz,
Russia, Ukraine Trade Blame in EU Gas Crisis, DENVER POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at 14A, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_11446493.
38. Jesse Broehl, Colorado Voters Pass Renewable Energy Standard,RENEWABLEENERGY
WORLD.COM, Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2004/111
colorado-voters-pass-renewable-energy-standard-17736.
Colorado citizens passed the Renewable
Portfolio Standard(s) (RPS) through Amendment 37 in November 2004. Id Colorado was "the first
state to mandate renewable-energy use at the ballot box," Xcel Energy opposed the initiative and
then met the standard 8 years ahead of schedule. Slevin, supra note 14. Because of the initiative's
success, the Colorado Legislature increased the goals (20% by 2020) through Colorado House Bill
1281, which passed in March of 2007. Colorado News: Doubling of Colorado's RPS,
http:/ltomkonrad.wordpress.com/2007/03/17/
colorado-rps/ (Mar. 17, 2007,21:32 MST).
39. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, http://appsl.eere.
energy.gov/states/maps/renewable-portfolio-states.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
40. See American Wind Energy Ass'n, The Mechanics of a Renewables Portfolio Standard Applied at the Federal Level, http://www.awea.org/policy/rpsmechfed.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
In some states, the RPS will not result in significant renewable energy development. For example,
the wealth of biomass in Maine means few alternatives will need to be developed in order to implement its 30% RPS. See RYAN WISER & OLE LANGNISS, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD
IN TEXAS: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT 16 (2001), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports49107.
pdf. However, the RPS in Texas has resulted in significant development since it was established in
1999. See id at 7.
41. CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 5, 15 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds.,
2007), availableathttp:l/www.ipcc.chlpublications_and_datalpublications-ipcc-fourth assessment_
report-synthesisreport.htm.
42. AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Pictures 2006). An Inconvenient Truth is a 2006
documentary produced by former Vice President Al Gore which emphasized the problems of global
warming and the urgency of slowing consumption of fossil fuels.
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within ten years.43
Although wind power continues to suffer some setbacks,44 among
renewable power sources, wind is a favorite. As a result, it is "the fastest growing source of new power generation in the United States., 45 Although it accounts for less than 1% of the total electricity generation in
the United States, 46 wind power provides over 6% of the electricity generated in at least four states. 47
The U.S. wind industry saw a record year in 2008, increasing its capacity 50% by constructing an additional 8,500 megawatts (MW) of new
wind power generation facilities.48 The new total capacity of over 25,300
to surpass Germany as the world's
MW has allowed the United States
49
leader in installed wind capacity.
Within the United States, Texas's generating capacity of 7,118 MW
accounts for approximately one-quarter of the United States's total installed wind power capacity. 50 Iowa and California are the next highest
51
wind power states with 2,791 and 2,517 MW of capacity respectively.
Minnesota, Washington, Colorado, and Oregon follow in that order,
each with a wind power capacity of over 1,000 MW in 2008.52
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF SEVERED RIGHTS-SLICING PROPERTY INTO
SEPARATE ESTATES TO DEVELOP MINERAL RESOURCES

From the perspective of a celestial being or an alien spaceship, a
property right in the United States consists of more than a flat postage
43. Gore, supra note 13.
44. See LOGAN & KAPLAN, supra note 34, at 4.
In some regions, a lack of transmission capacity is already beginning to constrain further
growth in the wind power sector. And in states like Iowa, Texas, and Minnesota, where
wind power has achieved a higher share of total electricity generation, there are concerns
that additional wind power could lead to higher prices or threaten grid security. Finally,
there is currently a shortage of wind turbine components and a backlog in scheduling
transmission interconnection, leading to delays and rising costs.
Id.
45. Id. at 3.
46. LOGAN & KAPLAN, supra note 34, at 4 n.12 ("Wind farms in the United States generated
approximately 32 billion kilowatt-hours in 2007 compared to total power sector generation of 4,160
billion kilowatt-hours.... The American Wind Energy Association forecasts that the U.S. wind industry will generate 48 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in 2008.").
47. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY: ANNUAL REPORT ON U.S. WIND POWER INSTALLATION, COST
AND PERFORMANCE TRENDS: 2007 7 (2008). Minnesota, Iowa, Colorado, and South Dakota are the

four states that generate at least 6% of their energy from wind power. Id. The DOE report also
notes that because wind provides such a large percentage of some states' electricity needs, it is losing
its status as an "alternative" source. See id at 7-10.
48. AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASS'N., ANNUAL WIND INDUSTRY REPORT FOR YEAR ENDING
2008 2, availableathttp://www.awea.orglpublications/reports/AWEA-Annual-Wind-Report-2009.
pdf.

49. Id.at 2.
50. Id.at 9 Figure 9-10.
51. Id.
52. Id The top 11 states with installed capacity are Texas (7,118 MW), Iowa (2,791 MW), California (2,517 MW), Minnesota (1,754 MW), Washington (1,447 MW), Colorado (1,068 MW), Oregon
(1,067 MW), Illinois (915 MW), New York (832 MW), Oklahoma (831 MW), and Kansas (815 MW).
Id.
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stamp on the surface of the earth. A property owner has a threedimensional right, which when pivoted to a cross-section view, reveals
that private ownership extends above and below the line at the earth's
surface. This vision of property ownership is labeled the ad coelum or
"unified fee" doctrine. 53 Under this doctrine, the owner of the soil, or
surface, also has ownership rights in everything from the center of the
earth to the skies.54 Commentators cite the ad coelum or unified fee
55
doctrine as justification for wind rights severance.
Borrowing from early English law, the courts "of practically every
state" in the United States have at one point adopted the ad coelum
maxim. 56 Although it has been modified or rejected in some jurisdictions,57 the concept of property ownership as three dimensional -a pillar or cone from the center of the earth to the heavens-is frequently
the starting point for the severed-estate analysis.
Early commentators viewed division of the unified fee estate as a
"derogat[ion] from the general rights of property., 58 The following,
subsection A, explores the evolution of mineral severance and the justifications for it, including the belief that severance facilitates development of the subsurface for the public good and that use of the subsurface estate could occur with minimal disturbance to the surface.
Subsection B shows how these severance rationales do not support its
application in the context of wind rights. Instead of facilitating development, severance of both the wind and the mineral estates creates new
obstacles for a party attempting to create a wind farm. Also, the per-

53. See Wind Power, supra note 20, at 834. Ad coelum is short for cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum which means "he who owns the soil likewise owns all the way to the heavens"
(translation by the author). Some authorities have suggested that the full language of the maxim is
"cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos," meaning "[t]o whomever the soil belongs,
he owns also the sky and the depths." See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., HEMINGWAY OIL AND GAS LAW

AND TAXATION 31 n.15 (4th ed. 2004). However, the additional language-"the sky and the
depths"-was not in the original version. Blackstone cites Williams on Real Propertyfor the concept
of possession "upwards as well as downwards, to an indefinite extent." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 18, n.19 (Lewis ed. 1915) (citation omitted). Blackstone
also notes that the concept of "land" including everything under it, or over it, is qualified because
"[in the case of mines, custom has in many places made an exception to this rule." Id. at 18 n.21; see
also Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971) ("It has long been recognized that ownership of real property includes not only the surface but also that which lies beneath and above the
surface. The use of land extends to the use of the adjacent air.").
54. Actually, Lord Coke focused on the value of soil (solum) and land (fleth) arising from the
fact that "it is for the habitation of man... [flor as the heavens are the habitation of Almightie God,
so the earth hath he appointed as the suburbs of heaven to be the habitation of man ... [as it] doth
furnish man with many other necessaries for his use."
LITTLETON, L.1, C.1, Sec. 1 (1832).

EDWARDO COKE, COMMENTARY UPON

55. See sources cited supranote 20.
56. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1932); see United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61, n.5 (1946) (noting that the ad coelum doctrine is an ancient common
law doctrine); see also Swetland, 55 F.2d at 202 (stating that: "We are told that this maxim was imported into the English law by Lord Coke... and that it has been approved in Baten's Case").
57. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. 2008).
58. ROSSITER W. RAYMOND, RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS TO MINING, H.R. Doc. No. 40-54,
at 210 (1869).
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petual footprint of wind turbines and the accompanying spider web of
transmission, collection, and distribution lines interfere with many concurrent uses of the surface.
A. The Evolution of MineralSeverance
The primary rationale for severing wind estates from surface estates is drawn from the analogy that mineral estates can be severed from
the surface. Therefore, this section starts by analyzing the origins of,
and rationale for, severed minerals. 59 However, I preface this section
with one caveat: Systems of mining law do not fit neatly into distinct
types, and those who have attempted in the past to "logically arrange [it]
for the purpose of treatment" have found the task "almost insurmountable." 6° Consequently, this treatment is only a broad overview.
How did the concept of separate ownership of minerals first arise?
It appears that one of the rationales for severance was the wondrous
and divine nature of metals. The word "royalty" means not only a person of royal rank, but also a right or prerogative of the sovereign to receive a percentage of mining proceeds. 61 In the first period of Greek
mining, many believed that a royalty was owed to the gods.62 For example, Greek miners sent one tenth of the production from the mines of
Siphnos to the shrine of the god Apollo at Delphi.63 Later, when payment was stopped and the mines were flooded by the sea, "this disaster
was ascribed to the wrath of Apollo at being deprived of his divine royalty!" 64 In England, the rationale was that "gold and silver are the most
excellent things which the soil contains [so] the law has appointed them,
as in reason it ought to, to the person most excellent, and that is the
65
king."
Aside from the beauty of metals, conquering sovereigns claimed
right to them for pragmatic reasons as well-they were necessary for
warfare.66 Pliny called iron "the most deadly fruit of human ingenuity"
59. Other models have relied on the theories for ownership of wild animals or ownership of
percolating waters. See, e.g., Hogwood, supranote 20, at 8-11; see discussion infra Part IV.B.2. (discussing the comparison of wind rights to groundwater rights).
60. JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 8 (1987) (citing
CURTIS H. LINDLEY, 1 A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL
LANDS 125 (3d ed., Bancroft-Whitney 1914)).
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (9th ed. 2009).
62. See RAYMOND, supra note 58, at 184.
63. Id.

64. Id
65. id at 206 (quoting Pettus, Fodinae, and Regales).
66. Id.at 182.
[T]he first period in the history of mining closes with the overthrow of the Persian Empire
by Alexander, and the transfer of the treasure and resources of the Orient into European
hands.... The immense quantities of gold and silver employed by governments, and their
use in constant wars, also confirm our conjecture that the mines of Asia and Africa were
the property of the rulers, and that they were worked by slaves.
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because it was forged to create weapons of war.6 7 Historians argue that
empires have been founded based on the advantages some conquerors
enjoyed from using superior metals as opposed to those available to the
68
vanquished civilizations.
Sovereigns could force prisoners or slaves to perform the dangerous work of mining, but they often found that this was not the best way
to develop their mineral resources. 69 Generally, prisoners and slaves
were unskilled laborers who "wasted, 71 the mines by using practices
such as "high grading"-mining that targets extraction of the highest
grade ore for a quick profit, but ultimately prevents development of the
deposit's full potential, such as removing support columns and allowing
an underground mine to collapse or flood.71
Eventually, sovereigns recognized that their mines could best be
developed by luring those who were especially skilled in prospecting
and producing the minerals. 72 The Greeks were some of the first to encourage private prospecting.7 3 At the Laurion Mines in Attica, the
Athenian state encouraged prospecting by granting leases. 74 Although

the lessee was required to pay a premium and a royalty to the citizens of
Athens, the lessee could keep the remainder of the extracted minerals
produced.75 Essentially, the sovereign owned the real property of the
67. GEORGIUS AGRICOLA, DE RE METALLICA 11 (translated by Herbert Clark Hoover & Lou

Henry Hoover trans., Dover Publications 1950) (1556) (quoting Pliny, SSSIV, 39).
68. See, e.g., James D. Muhly, Metalworking/Mining in the Levant, in NEAR EASTERN
ARCHAEOLOGY 174-83 (2003) (describing the now-contested theory that the Hittites of Anatolia in
Asia Minor, now part of the Republic of Turkey, had a monopoly on ironworking that allowed them
to establish an empire during the Late Bronze Age); see also JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND
STEEL (1999).
69. John C. Lacy, Going with the Current: The Genesis of the Mineral Laws of the United
States,41 ROCKY MTN.MIN. L. INST 10-1, 10-3 (1995).
Historically, the legal structure governing the right to exploit minerals has been a function
of how a nation has acquired a mineral resource. If the resource was acquired by conquest,
as was the case with the pre-modern era efforts of the Persians, Assyrians, Egyptians,
Greeks, Romans, and Carthaginians (and continue during the initial Spanish colonial effort
in the New World), the conqueror would force the subjugated people to work the existing
mines within the newly acquired territory.... The primary focus of laws related to these
mines was therefore concerned with ensuring that the monarchy got its dues from production and that the mine operators did not unnecessarily deplete the slave population that
was required to win the captured wealth.
Id.at 10-3.
70. In legal terminology, "waste" means "[sipoil or destruction, done or permitted, to lands ...
by the tenant thereof, to the prejudice of the heir." Kimbrough v. Reed, 943 P.3d 1232, 1234 (Idaho
1997). Ct BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 1727 (defining "waste" as "[plermanent
harm to real property committed by a tenant (for life or for years) to the prejudice of the heir, the
reversioner, or the remainderman").
71. See, e.g., VII THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 227 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds.,
2nd ed. 1989).
72. See 2 T.A. RICKARD, MAN AND METALS 576 (1932) ("During the long dark ages during
which the miner was shackled the technique of mining languished; not until he gained his freedom
did the winning of the metals become an art.").
73. Lacy, supra note 69, at 10-5.
74. See id at 10-5 n.9
75. Id.at 10-5 (stating that although production started earlier, the major workings occurred
between 600 and 200 B.C.E.); see also CHARLES HOWARD SHINN, MINING CAMPS: A STUDY IN

AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT 15-16 (1884) (stating that production from these mines was
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minerals in the ground, but the prospectors acquired a personal property interest in the minerals themselves once they extracted them.
Roman emperors also addressed the problem of "leasing [mines] to
unscrupulous speculators," and the resulting waste, by granting prospectors a share of the minerals once mined.76 For example, Valentinian I
granted permission to prospect for metals upon payment of a royalty."
But this system was instituted too late to avoid premature exhaustion of
many of the Roman mines: "mining ... declined rapidly after the third
century; and after the fifth century, when the barbarian78 hordes overwhelmed with successive invasions.., it ceased entirely.,
While the Greek and Roman systems allowed prospectors to retain
a portion of the fruits of their efforts, the concept of granting an entirely
separate estate below the surface seems to have originated in Western
Europe in the area that now encompasses modern Germany. 79 Reasoning that the subterranean art of mining was "carried on neither within
the same boundaries nor by the same persons as agriculture," it is not
surprising that these peoples created the fable of the mining dwarf and
established separate mining laws "not dependent upon the ordinary laws
of property. '"80 Thus arose the principle of Bergbaufreiheit or "free
mining," 81 which recognized the "existence of an estate in minerals, entirely independent of the estate in soil."' 82 In contrast to serfs who were
tied to the land of a particular lord, free miners were permitted unrestricted exploration on the government's or others' lands and, because
of their special talents, were allowed to participate in creating the rules

first recorded in 800 B.C.E. with royalties paid to the citizens of Athens).
76. RAYMOND, supra note 58, at 187-88.
77. Id.at 188.
78. Id
79. Lacy, supra note 69, at 10-10.
80. RAYMOND, supranote 58, at 189-90.
Mining is the only industry which extends its activity into the earth's interior.... Mining
was therefore even in the pre-historic times already separated, as an independent industry,
from other exploitations of the soil. It is carried on neither within the same boundaries nor
by the same persons as agriculture. Under the influence of this distinction peculiar legal relations were established in Germany at a very early day, probably at the commencement of
systematic mining, which have for their subject the subterranean deposits, and are not dependent upon the ordinary laws of property ... in all the original centres of German mining, the principle of mining freedom (Bergbaufreiheit)established itself, permitting all persons to search for useful minerals, and granting to the discoverer of such a deposit the
rights of property within certain limits. ... In this existence of an estate in minerals, entirely
independent of the estate in soil, lies the distinctive character of German mining law. It is
eminently a special law, not subordinate to the civil law, but co-ordinate with it.... Where
the mining freedom of which we have spoken does not exist, where the owner of the soil
possesses, as in England, the exclusive right to the minerals contained in it, there can be no
such thing as a distinct mining law.
The Roman law gave, as a rule, the mineral right to the landowner; but the opposite
principle seems to have sprung up spontaneously in Germany.
Id.at 189-90.
81. See ANTHONY SCOTr, THE EVOLUTION OF RESOURCE PROPERTY RIGHTS 208-46 (2008)
(discussing "Free Mining from Medieval Europe to the Gold Rushes").
82. RAYMOND, supra note 58, at 189.
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that controlled how they extracted the minerals they found. 8 3 Eventually, the German government entirely surrendered its claim to rights in
the minerals within its borders, instead placing itself on the same footing
84
as private citizens with respect to ownership.
Other countries did not widely embrace the German concept of
mineral severance. Spanish law, which is the source of the mining law in
Mexico and most South American countries, retained ownership of
mineral rights in the sovereign.8 5 In France, the monarch owned the
mineral rights until that country no longer had a monarch.8 6 In 1791, the
law changed to make mineral deposits in France the property of the nation, and the government granted concessions for them.8 7 Later, under
Napoleon's law of 1810, ownership of minerals went to the owner of the
land's surface. 8 8 However, the French Government retained the right to
grant a separate mineral right, even in perpetuity, to someone other
89
than the surface owner, so long as the grantee paid tribute to the State.
As English law developed in a common law system, mining law was
"complicated with many local regulations and 'immemorial customs.' 90
Generally, precious metals and, in some cases, copper and tin belonged
to the crown.91 Aside from these claims by the crown, the fee owner of
the land enjoyed a prima facie holding of the mineral rights to the
92
land.
Later attempts to charge free miners with trespassing failed after
British courts determined that free miners had the legal basis for claiming their own rights in mining fields.93 The courts then, and now, have
struggled with the nature of the mineral right. Some characterized it as
simply a right to dig and a property right in the minerals themselves
once separated from the soil.94 The alternative created a property inter83. ScoTr, supranote 81, at 208.
84. See RAYMOND, supranote 58, at 199 (noting the German government did retain a right to a
royalty).
85. Id at 196.

86. Id at 204.
87. Id

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
at 205 (noting this made the interest secure and taxable to protect capitalist investment).
Id at 206.
Id.
"[The crown] attempted to [exercise] the royal prerogative [over] copper and tin." Id.at

207.
92. Id.
at 207; see also Lacy, supra note 69, at 10-18 (describing how the British system evolved
from two distinct bodies of law with Celtic and Roman influences).
93. ScoTr, supra note 81, at 217.
94. The right is called a profit a prendre. See Costa Mesa Union Sch. Dist. of Orange County v.
Sec. First Nat'l Bank, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113,118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
A right of profit a prendre is a right to make some use of the soil of another, such as a right
to mine metals; the underlying principle is that it carries the right of entry and the right to
remove and take from the land the designated products or profit; in addition, it includes the
right to use such of the surface as is necessary and convenient for the exercise of the profit.
Id.
Also termed right of common: "A profit a prendre has been described as a 'right to take something
off another person's land."' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 1330 (citation omitted).
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est in the minerals in place, a separate
and enduring real estate interest
95
that coexisted with the surface estate.
Significantly, British cases that permitted severance noted that allowing a separate mineral estate was an abrogation of the common law
concept of absolute ownership by the surface owner. 96 Consequently,
the right to sever an estate out of the surface owner's right is often
strictly construed.97
This "derogat[ion] from the general rights of property" seems to be
justified by two concepts.98 First, the severed minerals are so far below
the surface that the surface owner normally would not want, or be
skilled enough, to exploit them. 99 For example, even under the German

The key distinction is that a profit a prendre is not ownership in the underlying property, but a right
to exploit that property.
95. The property right of minerals in place is a corporeal hereditament. RAYMOND, supra note
58, at 207.
In the case of alienation there is an important distinction between such a conveyance as
confers an estate and such as merely confers a right to dig, without property in the minerals
until severed from the soil. A conveyance of the former class is binding forever, whether
the owner of the minerals continues to work for them or not. This distinction of law between an estate in minerals and the right to mine is an important one; it describes exactly
the step which the United States government takes in the mining law of 1866, by which a
perpetual estate is granted to those who had up to that time only been able to enjoy a possessory title, conferring the right to mine.
Id at 207.
96. Id. at 210-11 (citing English cases).
Upon the ownership of the land, giving a pima fade title to minerals, the custom of bounding has been in engrafted. In substance it is this: the mine is parcel of the soil; the ownership is in the owner of the soil, but it is a parcel which, to discover and bring to the surface,
may ordinarily require capital, skill, enterprise, and combination; which, while in the bowels of the earth, is wholly useless to the owner as well as to the public: and the bringing of
which into the market is eminently for the benefit of the public. If, therefore, the owner of
the soil cannot, or will not, do this for himself, he shall not be allowed to lock it up from the
public ... [and] any man employing himself in tin mining, may secure for to himself the
right to dig the mines under the lands, rendering a certain portion of the produce to the
owner of the soil.
Customs, especially where they derogate from the general rights of property, must be construed strictly; and above all things, they must be reasonable. Bounding is a direct interference with the common law rights of property: it takes from the owner of the land, who is
unable or unwilling at a particular moment to dig for tin under his waste land, the right to
do so, it may be forever, and it vests in a stranger, making only the customary render in return; it empowers the stranger not only to extract the mineral from beneath the surface, but
to enter on the surface, and cumber with machinery, buildings, and refuse stuff, which the
operations below occasion, and all of this without the least regard to the convenience or interests of the owner. The only things which make this reasonable are the render of the tolltin to the owner, and the benefit to the public secured thereby in the extraction of the mineral from the bowels of the earth.... If it be said that the public good is best served by that
regulated supply which best serves the private interests of the bounder, that wherever it is
for the interest of the public that the mine should be worked ....
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 210.
99. Id.
[T]he ownership is in the owner of the soil, but it is a parcel which, to discover and bring to
the surface, may ordinarily require capital, skill, enterprise, and combination; which, while
in the bowels of the earth, is wholly useless to the owner as well is to the public ....
Id. at 210.
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code, surface deposits are left to the surface owner. 10 0 Likewise, in
Saxony-where the brown coal, or lignite, is often less than 150 feet below the surface and mined by surface methods, such as "opencast" or
open pit mining-coal belongs to the surface owner."0 Thus, only the
deeper minerals are severed-with the expectation that they could be
exploited with minimal disturbance to the surface. 10 2 The wellrecognized mining law concepts of subjacent support and compensation
for the surface owner'0 3 further reinforce that a system endorsing severance does not anticipate
significant conflicts between mineral and sur04
face estate owners.
The second justification for abrogating the common law and allowing severance of minerals as a separate estate is the "benefit to the public secured thereby in the extraction of the mineral from the bowels of
the earth.'' 10 5 Not only did the public benefit from the availability of
more minerals as a resource, but the6 royalties also provided an "advan10
tage ... to the coffers of the state."'

So, how did the law of mineral severance come to the United
States, and what were its justifications? Its implementation was haphazard rather than reasoned-a "post hoc rationalization of a fait accompi.

' 10 7

First, we were unprepared.0

8

Gold was discovered near Coloma,

100. Id at 199.
101. Id. A similar rule has developed in the United States, where at least one court has held that
"near surface" coal deposits belong to the owner of the surface estate as a matter of law if it is shown
that reasonable extraction methods would completely destroy or deplete the surface. See Reed v.
Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743,747 (Tex. 1980).
102. See AGRICOLA, supra note 67, at 11.
[Tlhe miners dig almost exclusively in mountains otherwise unproductive, and in valleys invested in gloom, they do either slight damage to the fields or none at all. Lastly, where
woods and glades are cut down, they may be sown with grain after they have been cleared
from the roots of shrubs and trees.
Id.
103. E.g., RAYMOND, supra note 58, at 194. ("This freedom of prospecting was, however, limited
so far that the foundations of buildings must not be injured, and all damages done to the surface or to
agriculture must be paid.").
104. The fallacy of this assumption and the long history of conflict are discussed below. See discussion infra Part III. B.
105. RAYMOND, supra note 58, at 210-11.
106. Id at 194.
107. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS & RESOURCES § 5:4 (2009); see also SAMUEL
C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES (1905).
[Early settlers] dug for gold; excavated mineral rock; constructed ditches, flumes and canals
for conducting water; built mills for sawing lumber and grinding corn; established farms for
cultivating the earth; made settlements for the grazing of cattle; laid off towns and villages;
felled trees; diverted watercourses.... All of these are open and notorious facts ....
If they have acquired rights, these rights rest upon doctrine of presumption of a grant of
right, arising either from the tacit assent of the sovereign, or from expression of her will in
the course of her general legislation, and, indeed, from both.
Id.at 14-15.
108. See SCOTr, supra note 81, at 219 ("In 1848 miners discovered gold in California, which Mexico had only recently transferred into American possession. The successful prospectors found themselves in a legal vacuum regarding the rights to their finds ....").
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California, in January of 1848.109 This was about two weeks before the
U.S. government acquired the new territory from Mexico by the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo.11 ° Although the Supreme Court had previously
ruled that the United States held title to all minerals found on the public
domain,111 the military governor in what was to be California, Colonel
Richard B. Mason, refused to assert any sovereign claim to the minerals.' 12 Instead, he declared the miners free from official control." 3
Colonel Mason had little choice: Unruly prospectors eager to exploit
their finds outnumbered Mason's soldiers by 1,000 to 1.114
Almost twenty years after Colonel Mason's declaration, Congress's
wrestling over the issue of how to treat mineral rights in the United
States resulted in the enactment of the Lode Mining Act of 1866115 and
the Placer Act of 1870.116 Both Acts accepted much of the status quo by
declaring mineral lands open to exploration. Congress abandoned attempts to charge a tax or royalty and instead hoped to generate revenue
for the national government through charging for patents.1 7 Because
these initial Acts did not "create a fully developed disposal system" for
minerals, 118 Congress enacted the General Mining Act of 1872.119 As
the nation expanded westward, each of these mining laws reflected the
federal "policy of public land management [during that period] to convey lands into private ownership as quickly as possible., 120 The disposal
philosophy was based on an assumption that most public lands were
non-mineral in character, so mineral production on some lands and the
increased demand for patents to public lands as a spinoff would "indi121
rectly pay [off the post-Civil War] national debt.,
Although the governmental report that led to the 1872 Mining Law

109. GREGORY YALE, LEGAL TITLES TO MINING CLAIMS AND WATER RIGHTS, IN CALIFORNIA,
UNDER THE MINING LAW OF CONGRESS, OF JULY, 1866 14 (1867).
110. Id at 17. Because communications at the time were poor, Colonel Mason and other military officers in California did not know the treaty had been signed in Mexico. Id
111. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526,538(1840).
112. YALE, supra note 109, at 17.
113. Id. (stating that Colonel Mason declared the Mexican laws abolished and "public use was
continued by the virtual removal of restrictions").
114. Lacy, supra note 69, at 10-35.
It was a matter of serious reflection with me how I could secure to the Government certain
rents or fees for the privilege of procuring this gold; but upon considering the large extent
of country, and the character of the people engaged, and the small scattered force at my
command. I resolved not to interfere, but to permit all to work freely.
Id. at 10-35.
115. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 1, 14 Stat. 251 (1866) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 22
(2006)).
116. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 12, 16 Stat. 217 (1870) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 22
(2006)).
117. LOREN L. MALL, PUBLIC LAND AND MINING LAW 155-56 (2d ed. 1981).
118. Id at 157.
119. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-6, 17 Stat. 91-93 (1872) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 22
(2006)).
120. Lacy, supranote 69, at 10-41.
121. MALL, supranote 117, at 155.
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reflected the wisdom of the day "that mining flourishes best when the
property in minerals is distinguished from the ownership of the soil," it
ultimately did not recommend mineral severance. 122 Instead, the report
concluded that miners should be granted patents, or fee ownership, to
the entire surface and mineral estates combined.123 One reason for clear
title was security of investment capital for miners and their stakeholders. 124 Also, the U.S. government had concluded that it did not
have the resources to extract royalties from the miners. 125 As mineral
"rushes" had become the driving force for much of the economic development and settlement of the Western United States at that time, the
federal government simply hoped to reap the only financial benefit it
could.1 26 It did so by selling patents in what seemed to be otherwise unsettled, and presumably unproductive, portions of the western territo127
ries of the United States.
Granting fee simple patents avoided conflicts between mineral and
surface estates, but this consideration does not seem to be the basis for
the 1872 Mining Law's policy. The potential for conflict between the
mineral and surface estates was not discussed in the governmental report.
Patentees under the 1872 Mining Law may have received unified
fee simple estates, but the government did not continue with this practice. After 1900, Congress severed coal and other minerals in patents
issued for many surface uses such as agricultural entry, stock-raising
128
homesteads, and grazing lands.
However, in the many situations where the surface owner did not
also receive the patent or a unified fee simple in both the surface and
mineral estate, the concept of severance has created significant problems for split estates throughout the United States. The long history of
conflict between mineral and surface estate owners has proved the fallacy of any assumption that severed minerals are so far below ground
122. RAYMOND, supra note 58, at 218.
123. Id.at 218-19.
124. Id.
at 222.
125. Id.
at 216.
126. See id at 218.
127. See id.
Although history abundantly shows that mining flourishes best when the property in minerals is distinguished from the ownership of the soil, it seems to me good policy for the
United States, in selling the mines, to sell also the surface. In most cases the land will never
be taken up for agricultural purposes, and if the miner does not buy it no one will. I do not
mean that the ownership of minerals should go invariably with the soil, but that, where the
United States has both for sale, both should be sold to the same party, who may afterwards
dispose of either as he likes.
Id.
128. It is beyond the scope of this article to address Congress's continued struggle after enacting
the 1872 Mining Law to create some balance between its desire to encourage the settlement and patenting of public lands for agricultural, ranching, and settlement purposes and its desire to develop
mineral resources. See, e.g., JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 1040-45 (2006);
MALL, supra note 117, 74-82.

The Severed Wind PowerRights Conundrum

20091

that they can be exploited with minimal surface disturbance.' 29 Furthermore, in many instances, complications due to split estates have
been a disincentive, rather than an incentive, to the development of resources.
B. ProblemsApplying TraditionalMineralSeverance Rationales to
Wind
As property law has evolved, it has created increased flexibility for
landowners to divide their estates. 13' Consequently, landowners appear
not only to have authority over the wind that flows across their surface
estates, but also authority to sever the wind rights from those surface estates. 1 31 Despite this authority, the question remains not whether wind
can be severed, but whether it is in society's best interest to allow wind
severance.
Traditional mineral severance rationales of minimal surface disturbance and encouraging development of resources seem to support nonseverance in the wind context. First, wind power development requires
more extensive use of the surface than most mineral development.
Much mineral development is through underground mining, in situ
leaching, or extraction drilling, all of which have a fairly small surface
footprint in comparison to wind. In contrast, wind ties up much of the
surface for roads, substations, operations and maintenance facilities, and
laydown yards.' 32 While some surface uses, such as grazing or farming,
may coexist with wind development, spider webs of subsurface and
overhead transmission, collection, and distribution lines can interfere
with many other uses of the land. 33
Furthermore, even if mineral development is through strip or open129. For valuable coverage of this topic see Bruce M. Kramer, The Legal Framework for Analyzing Multiple Surface Use Issues, in SEVERED MINERALS, SPLIT ESTATES, RIGHTS OF ACCESS, AND
SURFACE USE IN MINERAL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS

(Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2005); see also

Donald Zillman, The Common Law ofAccess and Surface Use in Oil, Gas, and Mining, in SEVERED
MINERALS, supra.
130. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Develop-

ment of the Modem Concept of Property,29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 328-30 (1980) ("As the nineteenth
century progressed, increased exceptions to both the physicalist and the absolutist elements of Blackstone's conception of property were incorporated into law.... The protection of value rather than
things-the dephysicalization of property -greatly broadened the purview of property law."); see

also Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property,in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) ("[T]he theory of property rights held by the modern specialist tends both to dissolve the notion of ownership and to eliminate any necessary connection between property rights and things."); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,40
STAN. L. REV. 611, 614 (1988) (stating that under a relational approach "[rights are not limited to
the initial allocation of property entitlements or the agreement of the parties, but emerge and change

over the course of the relationship").
131.
132.

See, e.g., Severance, supra note 20, at 1-4.
See K.K. DuVivier & Roderick E. Wetsel, Jousting at Wind Mills: When Wind Power De-

velopment Collides with Oil, Gas, and MineralDevelopment, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. Paper
No. 9, 9-4 (forthcoming 2009).
133.

Id.
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pit mining, which requires removal of the entire surface, the use is temporary, and the surface is reclaimed after the mineral is extracted. In
contrast, wind power is renewable and never depleted, thus, wind generation facilities might require perpetual surface use. 34
The second traditional justification for allowing severance of minerals is that mineral extraction and exploitation benefits the public by
encouraging skilled workers to develop the resource, thus, making more
minerals available for public consumption.135 Yet, instead of encouraging wind development, severing wind rights impedes it for at least three
reasons.
First, separating wind rights from the surface estate removes the
surface owner from the negotiating table. Because wind development
requires extensive, long-term surface use, the surface owners are the
parties most impacted. Taking them out of the equation seriously complicates surface access and damages negotiations.
Second, landowners who retain control over both the mineral and
wind rights can serve important roles as mediators in disputes between
competing developer interests. Landowners who receive royalties from
both mineral and wind development have a financial incentive to see
both enterprises coexist. This incentive is eliminated when mineral and
wind rights are severed and the owners of these separate estates seek
only to maximize their own distinct interests.
Finally, the first two points above create such serious surface rights
issues that many commercial-scale wind investors are hesitant to work
with landowners who have severed their wind rights.1 36 Alternatively,
these investors hold up financing until they are provided with surface
use agreements from all interested parties, which can sometimes be an
insurmountable prerequisite. 3 7
In summary, while property law may permit the severance of wind
rights, the traditional rationales for mineral severance do not support
severance as the most effective method for encouraging the development of wind power. The next section addresses specific case precedents that have effectively classified wind as comparable to two specific
minerals-oil and water-and will illustrate why these specific regimes
are no better than the general mineral regime as an appropriate model
for the best treatment of wind rights.

134. However, global climate change may be decreasing winds and result in a decline of generating capacity for wind turbines. See Seth Borenstein, Global Warming Killing Wind? Researchers,
Kite Enthusiasts Worry, HUFFINGTON POST, June 10, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.comni2009/06/
10/global-warming-killing-wi-n_213610.html.
135. See RAYMOND, supra note 58, at 211 ("If it be said that the public good is best served by
that regulated supply.., for of interest of the public that the mine should be worked.").
136. Severance, supra note 20, at 5.
137. DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 132, at 9-7.
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SEVERANCE AND THE STATUS OF WIND RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES

A handful of authors have published articles specifically addressing
the status of wind rights. as Three of these authors are from Texas and
one from Iowa. 139 Each cites what was, until March 2009, the sole case
that had examined the issue: a case out of California's Court of Appeals,
Contra Costa Water District v. Vaquero Farms, Inc. 140 Each of these
authors used Contra Costa to illustrate that "wind is arguably a 'resevered and
source,' similar to oil," and, therefore, it is capable of being141
deeded apart from the surface estate in the same way as oil.
The most recent case addressing wind rights severance is Romero
v. Bernell.14 2 In Romero, the federal district court in New Mexico concluded that a property with a "principal value ... for wind farm development" could be partitioned, likening wind not to oil, but to a different
mineral -water. 143 The following two subsections examine the logic of
each of these two cases and illustrate why neither an oil regime nor a
water regime is the best paradigm for wind development.
A. The OilRegime
Contra Costa is the first case to address the property status of wind
power rights. Although Contra Costa framed the issue in the context of
condemnation, commentators have cited it as authority for likening
wind power rights to oil and applying a similar severance model to
them.' 44 Subsection 1 describes the Contra Costa case, and subsection 2
illustrates the waste resulting from an oil model, suggesting that the
same path would be detrimental to wind development.
1. Contra Costa
As the site of the first wind farm in the United States in 1980, California has a long history of wind power development. 145 Vaquero Farms
participated in this early wind development by leasing over 2,100 acres
of its ranch for wind power and permitting the installation of about 260
wind turbines. 4 6 Approximately ten years later, the local Water District
138. See sources cited supra note 20.
139. Lisa Chavarria, Terry Hogwood, and Ernest Smith are from Texas. Joseph O. Wilson is
from Iowa.
140. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
141. See Undertaking,supra note 20, at 3-4; Hogwood, supra note 20, at 7-8; Smith, supra note
20, at 302-03; Wilson, supra note 20, at 1784.
142. 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (D.N.M. 2009).
143. Id. at 1335 (stating "the most analogous natural resource" is water). The "mineral" label
references the discussion infra footnotes 192-195.
144. See sources cited supra note 141.
145. See WindPower, supra note 20, at 835.
146. Contra Costa, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274. The original Vaquero-wind leases were executed in
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sought to condemn portions of Vaquero's property for a reservoir. 147 In
compensating Vaquero for the portions of its property condemned, the
Water District adopted a money-saving tactic-the Water District
claimed it only acquired the fee interest for the surface.148 The final
deed reserved the wind rights and related leases to Vaquero, so the Wa149
ter District would not have to pay compensation for them.
The Contra Costa court stated the issue of the case in narrow
terms. "The question before us may be stated as follows: When a public
entity acquiresproperty through eminent domain, are the wind power
rights capable of segregation or are they so affixed to the underlying
land that they must be acquiredby the condemning authorit?' 150 Ultimately, the court concluded that the Water District could "as a matter
of law, reserve wind power rights from a condemnation of property...
[because] a condemnation of property for public use need not be un15 1
qualified, total,and unconditional.'
In reaching this conclusion, the Contra Costa court used broad language that seemed to apply a premise that wind is a resource similar to
oil as justification for severing a wind right in the same way as oil:
It is well settled that subsurface minerals, gas and oil are distinct property
rights which may be conveyed separately from the fee.... We agree with
the Water District's assertion that "[t]he right to generate electricity from
windmills harnessing the wind, and the right to sell the power so generated, is no different, either in law or common sense, from the right to
pump and sell subsurface oil, or subsurface natural gas by means of wells
and pumps." The Water District persuasively points out, "the argument
that harvesting windpower somehow requires greater usage of the surface
than harvesting oil and gas resources
defies common sense to anyone who
152
has seen a field of oil derricks."
However, the issue before the Contra Costa court was not property
rights in general, but compensation in a condemnation setting. The
court's language in other portions of the opinion reflects this narrower
focus on only an "interest in property":
The interests susceptible to condemnation under the statute, embrace any
right, title, or estate in property.... Intangible personal property, in addition to tangible property, may be taken-therefore, even
15 3 a professional
sports franchise is susceptible to a condemnation action.

California's statute allows condemnation of any "substantial right"
capable of being bought and sold in the marketplace. 15 4 There are many

1984. Id
147. Id
148. Id.
at 275.
149. Id.
150. Id at 276 (emphasis added).
151. Id at 278 (emphasis added).
152. Id
153. Id.
at 276 (internal quotations omitted).
154. Id.
at 277.
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rights related to property that fit this description that do not constitute
separate estates or severable rights. The sports franchise example in the
quote above is not a fee property interest. Similarly, a lease to property
is capable of being bought and sold, but leases are not considered severable fee interests.155
Wind rights are capable of being bought and sold. Furthermore,
the Contra Costa court's inverse logic -that if such an interest qualifies
as a right that can be separately condemned, it also can be severed from
a condemned interest-may be supportable. However, neither of these
rationales supports the conclusion that all wind rights should be separate interests severed from a fee. While the commentators above have
cited Contra Costa as support for that conclusion, no other court in the
country has chosen to cite it as authority for the severance of wind
rights.
2. Problems Applying an Oil Regime to Wind
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully describe and evaluate
the law of ownership rights to oil. There are countless articles and treatises on that topic.1 56 However, the lessons learned from oil development demonstrate that it should serve as a cautionary tale rather than as
a model for efficient and equitable wind production.
Unlike minerals in place, the "fugacious minerals" - oil, gas, and
water-flow from one property to another through pore spaces in the
ground. 57 To define ownership rights in fugacious minerals, courts
155. A lease is more often considered a contractual right permitting "free customization of the
rights and duties of the respective parties" in contrast to a property right that "requires the parties
adopt one of a limited number of standard forms that define the legal dimensions of their relationship." Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
773, 776 (2001). However, the line between contract and property rights is often blurred. See id at
777.
156. See, e.g., 1 KuNTz, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.1 (2007); LAWRENCE MILLS & J.C.
WILLINGHAM, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1926); Leslie Moses, The Evolution andDevelopment of
the Oil and Gas Lease, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF OIL AND GAS LAW
AND TAXATION AS IT AFFECTS THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 1-42 (1951); 1A W.L. SUMMERS, THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS 1-120 (3d ed. 2004); Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture andIts Implications as Applied to Oil andGas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391 (1935); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Ander-

son, The Rule of Capture-An Oil and GasPerspective,35 ENVTL. L. 899 (2005); James W. Simonton, The Nature of the Interest of the Grantee Under an Oil and Gas Lease, 25 W. VA. L. Q. 295
(1918); James A. Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas,19 MICH. L. REV. 161 (1920); James A. Veasey,
The Law of Oil and Gas, 18 MICH. L. REV. 749 (1920); James A. Veasey, The Lawof Oil and Gas, 18
MICH. L. REV. 652 (1920); James A. Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas,18 MICH. L. REV. 445 (1920).
157. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 291-98 (2d
ed. 2006); see also Dabney-Johnson Oil Corp. v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237(Cal. 1935).
The use of 'oil and gas in place' terminology which describes an unlimited grant of oil rights
as a present transfer of a fee in definite corporeal real property is anomalous. It fails to
take into account the fugacious and vagrant nature of oil and other hydrocarbon substances. Oil actualy brought to the surface to which the grantee's right attaches may be not
only the oil and gas in place beneath the surface of the assignor's land at the time of the assignment, but also oil drawn from beneath the surface of other lands. In our decision in
Callahan v. Martin, we reject the oil and gas in place doctrine, as have many other courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190,20
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analogized them as "minerals ferae naturae" having more in common
with wild animals than with other minerals because "they have the
1 58
power and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owner."
The ad coelum model, granting ownership from the heavens to the
center of the earth, does not work well to explain the ownership of fugacious minerals. For instance, fugacious minerals might physically lie below a particular surface owner's defined property boundaries, yet adjacent owners are allowed to invade that space to extract and "capture"
1 59
these minerals, thus, modifying the ad coelum ownership concept.
The "rule of capture" for oil-which vests title of fugacious minerals in
the first landowner to extract them-arose through the analogy of capturing a wild fox.1 60 Eventually, all oil producing states have adopted
161
the rule of capture in some form.
Under the rule of capture, the only way to prevent your neighbor
from sucking the oil under your property through a well on your
neighbor's adjacent property is to erect your own oil well and extract as
S.Ct. 576, 44 L.Ed. 729, but we find that nevertheless oil rights may be recognized and
transferred as interests in real property on other theories which give due recognition to the
fugacious character of the substances involved.
The owner of the land has exclusive right on his plan to drill for produced oil. This
right inhering in the owner by virtue of his title to the land is a valuable right which you
may transfer. The right when granted is a profit A prendre, a right to remove a part of the
substance of the land. A profit A prendre is an interest in real property in the nature of an
incorporeal hereditament.
Id at 242-43.
158. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889). In Westmoreland,the court wrote:
Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classified by themselves, if the analogy be
not too fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owner.
Their "fugitive and wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract was uncertain .. " They belong to the owner of the land, and are partofit, so long as they are on it
or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape, and go into other lands... the
title
of the former owner is gone. Possession of the land, therefore is not necessarily possession of the gas.
Id (emphasis added). For an excellent summary of how different states treat oil rights and how this
right might apply to the wind rights concept see Smith, supra note 20, at 243-50 nn.115-50.
159. See R.R. Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568-69 (Tex. 1962). In Manziel, the court
stated:
The orthodox rules and principles applied by the courts as regards surface invasions of land
may not be appropriately applied to subsurface invasions as arise out of the secondary recovery of natural resources.... Certainly, it is relevant to consider and weigh the interests
of society and the oil and gas industry as a whole against the interests of the individual operator who is damaged; and if the authorized activities in an adjoining secondary recovery
unit are found to be based on some substantial, justifying occasion, then this court would
sustain their validity.
We conclude that if, in the valid exercise of its authority to prevent waste, protect correlative rights, or in the exercise of other powers within its jurisdiction, the Commission authorizes secondary recovery projects, a trespass does not occur when the injected, secondary recovery forces move across lease lines, and the operations are not subject to an injunction on
that basis. The technical rules of trespass have no place in the consideration of the validity
of the orders of the Commission.
1d; see also Kramer & Anderson, supra note 156, at 900-11.
160. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
161. BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 293 n.2.
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much as you can before your neighbor does. 162 This approach resulted

in dueling derricks standing off along property lines, requiring far more
extraction wells than necessary.1 63 Excessive extraction rates also ultimately reduced extraction yields for entire oil fields.164 Thus, "[t]he rule
wasted large amounts
of capture resulted in pell-mell development 16that
5
of petroleum both above and below ground.,

After more than a half century of "chaotic, dangerous, and wasteful" development under the judicially-created rule of capture, some
states finally addressed the problem through legislation.

66

Gradually,

oil recovery improved as legislators experimented with various techniques to avoid waste such as controlling the spacing of extraction
wells, 167 mandating pooling of small tracks into an acreage sufficiently
large to secure a well permit,168 recognizing correlative rights between
owners,169 and ultimately, in some instances, mandating unitization. 70
"Unitization is the joint, coordinated operation of all, or a substan162. See Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (noting the only
remedy for a landowner injured by the rule of capture is "that of self-help go and do likewise").
163. See, e.g., Jared C. Bennett, Ownership of Transmigratory Minerals, Utah and Zebras:
Proof that Oil and Gas Ownership Law Needs Reform, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 349,

357-58 (2001); Northcutt Ely, The Conservationof Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1220-21 (1938); Dean
Lueck, The Rule of FirstPossessionand the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 394-95 (1995); J.
Howard Marshall & Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planningof Petroleum Production,41 YALE L. J. 33,
42-43,48-49 (1931).
164. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 163.
An oil pool is an engine; it represents an equilibrium of rock pressure, gas pressure and underlying water pressure. Pierced by a well, these forces propel oil or gas or water, or all
three, to the surface.... Under ideal conditions, those natural underground forces, i.e.,
"water drive," gas pressure, and so on, may be so harnessed and controlled as to lift to the
surface 90-95 percent of the oil contained in the reservoir, by flowing, over a long period of
years. But when oil is produced without restriction, the engine figuratively races itself to
pieces ....
Id. at 1219-20 (footnotes omitted).
165.

BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 298.

166. See id. at 298.
The doctrine holds that each owner of a common source of supply has both legal rights and
legal duties toward the other owners. The strongest right continues to be the rule of capture if exercised properly under common law tort principles and in compliance with a broad
range of state conservation laws which were enacted after 1900.
Id. at 299-300. Conservation statutes attempt to ensure that a reservoir will be produced at its Maximum Efficient Rate of Recovery (MER). See JOHNS. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL
AND GAS LAW 159 (5th ed. 2008). The common law also made attempts to mitigate detrimental effects of the rule of capture through such concepts as correlative rights. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190,211-12 (1900).
167. BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 300.
The excessive well drilling and wasteful production engendered by the rule of capture were
difficult to ignore. States began to enact conservation legislation like that in Ohio Oil, and
created regulatory agencies to implement the new laws. Many states enacted well spacing
rules which provided that no well could be drilled on less than a certain number of acres or
closer than so many feet from an existing well.... [However,] well spacing alone did not
address the most important factor affecting the ultimate percentage of oil recovered from a
field: the field's production rate.
Id.
168. See, e.g., Hardwicke, supranote 156, at 420-22; BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 306.
169. See, e.g., 1 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 139-44 (3d ed. 2004) (recognizing
correlative rights as the legal privilege to take oil and gas limited by a duty not to injure the source of
supply and not to take an undue proportion).
170. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 1982).
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tial part, of a reservoir as a single unit by all the different operators
holding leases in the field. '' 1 71 Unitization substitutes the competitive
rule of capture with cooperative development that is more productive
and less wasteful. 172 Unitization statutes force interest holders into a
single unit that increases the total recovery from an oil field. These statutes are necessary due to the second problem created by severance:
fractionalization.
Fractionalization occurs when oil interests are separated from the
surface estate and then subdivided, especially when transferred from
one generation to another through either wills or intestacy statutes. The
result is an oil interest owned by multiple cotenants. 173 These mineral
estates often become smaller and smaller over time causing severe problems for a party seeking to develop a property. It becomes nearly impossible to obtain complete agreement among all the174mineral owners,
and all it takes is one holdout to prevent development.
One author summarized the consequences of the early development of oil law in the United States this way:
The rule of capture and the absence of pooling and unitization statutes in
the early decades of the oil and gas development in the U.S., coupled with
private ownership of small tracts of land, have left an enduring legacy.
We are a nation
of marginal wells, many of which have become idle and
175
orphaned.
171. BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 315.

[Unitization] is distinguished from "pooling" which is the process of combining small tracts
of land into acreage large enough to secure a drilling permit to meet the spacing rules of the
conservation commission. Pooling prevents the drilling of unnecessary wells and protects
the correlative rights of all the owners being drained by the one well on the spacing unit
and usually occurs during primary production. Unitization combines many spacing units
into a fieldwide unit, usually to conduct secondary recovery operations.
id.
172. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 315 ("Most states have compulsory unitization statutes
which allow the conservation agency to force holdouts into a unit that is expected to increase the
total recovery from the field. Texas, the largest oil-producing state, does not."); see also id, at 315-16
("Compulsory unitization was castigated by the Texas independent producers for years as a 'substitution of force for persuasion ... another fetter on the step of Freedom, another move down the road
towards confiscation, tyranny, and unmorality' whose advocates were 'socialist, bureaucrats, selfseeking politicians [and] fuzzy thinkers of the left."') (quoting L. Proctor Thomas, Comment, Prospects for Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization in Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 510, 524 (1966)). The Texas
Railroad Commission responded by "arm twist[ing] the operators to unitize 'voluntarily' by shutting
in the fields or prorating them severely under the agency's broad authority to prevent waste." Id.at
316 (quoting Jacqueline L. Weaver, Unitization of Oil and Gas Fields, in TEXAS: A STUDY OF
LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL POLICIES 137-66 (1986)).
173. Id.at 318-19.
174. See, e.g., Law v. Heck Oil Co., 145 S.E. 601 (W. Va. 1928) (illustrating that an owner of an
undivided 1/768 oil and gas interest can prevent development of the entire tract); see also
BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 319 n.6 ("Few wells produce [enough] revenue in one month, so
thousands of royalty owners are due only a few pennies. The administrative costs to lessees of accounting to so many owners for their rightful shares of a well's revenues are very high.") (citing
Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, III, The Use of Law to Promote Domestic Exploration and
Production,50 INST. OF OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N. 2-1, 2-6 (1999)). "This fractionated ownership is one
reason that oil companies have sought to explore in areas where large tracts of land are available
owned by a single lessor-the government." BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 319 n.6.
175. BOSSELMAN, supra note 157, at 318 n.5.
Of the 550,000 producing oil wells in the U.S. in 1998, some 419,000 (or 76%) produced an
...
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Must wind suffer the same fate by blind analogy to the early law of oil
development?
Commentators have suggested that the rule of capture is appropriate for wind rights.17 6 Like oil, wind is fugacious in that it flows across
multiple properties and is not valuable until reduced to possession.177
To make it economically feasible, wind is best developed through wind
farms that combine acreage and space turbines in patterns that maximize electricity output and minimize obstructions. However, as in the
oil context, this cooperative development may not be easily achieved on
a voluntary basis. Consequently, legislation mandating unitization of
wind farms may avoid the necessity of multiple competing turbines attempting to capture the wind. Such legislation could encourage the
most efficient location of wind farms and the most effective development of an area's wind resources.
In addition, when wind rights are severed, they are also subject to
fractionalization into multiple sub-ownerships. 178 As with oil development, fractionalization can complicate the work of the wind developer
in putting together a sufficient number of properties to make the wind
farm economically feasible. Also, fractionalization increases the possibility that one holdout may seriously impede or prevent wind development.
B. The Water Regime
In March 2009, a federal district court judge addressed the status of
wind rights in Romero v. Bernell.1 79 In contrast to Contra Costa, Romero likened wind power rights not to oil, but to water. Subsection 1
describes the Romero case; subsection 2 shows how New Mexico's prior
appropriation water regime would also be problematic as a model for
wind power development.
1. Romero
In Romero, tenants in common of property located in Taos
County, New Mexico, petitioned the court for partition of their propaverage of two barrels per well per day. An astounding number of additional wells, about
343,000, were idle-not producing at all. Of these, only about half are idle with state ap-

proval. At least 57,000 orphaned wells existed-idle wells with no known operator and
which had not been properly plugged and sealed under state conservation laws.
Id. at 318 n.5 (citing Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The FederalGovernment as a Useful Enemy: Perspectives on the Bush Energy/EnvironmentalAgenda from the Texas Oilfields, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
1(2001)).
176. E.g., Hogwood, supra note 20.
177. See, e.g., Wind Power,supra note 20, at 834-35; Hogwood, supra note 20, at 6; see also Ro-

mero v. Bemell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 n.2 (D.N.M. 2009) (noting that in contrast unharnessed
wind is a "destructive force which diminishes the value of the land").

178. See supra text accompanying notes 173-174.
179. 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (D.N.M. 2009).
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erty. 180 The parties opposing the partition argued that "the property
cannot equitably be partitioned because the principal value of the prop181
erty appears to be for a wind farm development.',
The rationale used by the parties opposing partition hinged on the
treatment of wind rights as comparable to mineral rights. In New Mexico, "minerals in place are considered real estate" and "are not capable
of being partitioned.' ' 8 2 However, the Romero court rejected the
"premise that wind is analogous to minerals insitu. ' '183 The court went
on to note:
While New Mexico has no relevant statutory or case law on the subject, it
does not appear minerals in the ground are the appropriate commodity to
create a legal paradigm to analyze wind power.... Wind is never embedded in the real estate; rather, it is more like water or wild animals which
traverse the surface1 and
which do not belong to the fee owner until re84
duced to possession.

The Romero court referenced Contra Costa for the following
proposition:
The right to "harvest" wind energy is, then, an inchoate interest in the
land which does not become "vested" until reduced to "possession" by
employing it for a useful purpose. Only after it is reduced
to actual wind
1 85
power can wind energy then be severed and/or quantified.

Based on this reasoning, the Romero court concluded that "the
186
most analogous natural resource" to wind is water.
The precedential value of Romero for defining the status of wind
rights is yet to be tested; it is so recent that no other cases or commentators have cited it. However, it is interesting to note that Romero is the
first case to cite Contra Costa for the purpose of discussing the status of
wind rights. Yet, Romero does not cite Contra Costa for the holding
that most commentators have ascribed to it-that wind rights are analogous to oil rights.1 87 In fact, Romero explicitly seems to reject this characterization. 8
Also, the value of Romero as precedent for analogizing wind rights
to water rights may be qualified because the district court found alternative grounds for its result, stating:
180.

Id. at 1334.

181. Id.
182. Id.
at 1334, 1335.

183. Id.
at 1336 (footnote omitted).
184. Id at 1335.

185. Id.
(citing Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997)).
186. Id.
187. See id.
("The right to 'harvest' wind energy is, then, an inchoate interest in the land which
does not become 'vested' until reduced to 'possession' by employing it for a useful purpose. Only
after it is reduced to actual wind power can wind energy then be severed and/or quantified.") (footnote omitted).
188. See id ("Wind, in and of itself, does not appear to be susceptible of any ownership. It is not
like oil and gas in place where there is a deposit of hydrocarbons which can be reduced to possession
by one or more mineral owners of the tracts under which the hydrocarbon deposit resides.").
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Nor would it necessarily hold that even if the Court accepted Respondent's premise that wind is analogous to minerals in situ that partition
would be inappropriate. In a partition proceeding, the party claiming
has the
minerals prevent an equitable partition without manifest injury
18 9
burden of demonstrating that the land contains such minerals.

The party opposing the partition in Romero apparently did not
carry its burden because it argued only that "he might be disadvantaged
in the future if Petitioners develop a wind farm and if his share of the
court concluded
partitioned land is not invited to participate." 190 The
' 91
contemplate."'
to
speculative
"too
this assertion was
2. Problems Applying a Water Rights Regime to Wind
The United States Supreme Court has recognized water as "a 'mineral' in the broadest sense of that word., 192 Yet, the Court refused to
classify water as "a 'valuable mineral deposit"' regulated by the 1872
Mining Law because Congress early on recognized the power of the
states to control their own waters. 193 Furthermore, the states have not
regulated water uniformly, instead they have used a spectrum of approaches from prior appropriation to riparian rights and sometimes a
combination of both. 194 Also, the treatment of rights may depend on
whether the water is underground or in streams. 195 As Romerois a New
Mexico case, the discussion below focuses only on two specific aspects
of the New Mexico prior appropriation water regime and how that regime might apply in a wind context.
Of the western states, New Mexico was the first to adopt a prior
appropriation system for groundwater.! 96 Although the history of prior
appropriation is extensive, the criticism of it is almost as extensive.

189. Id.at 1335-36.
190. 1d.at 1334 (emphasis in original).
191. 1d.
192. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 610 (1978) (stating "[s]ince early
times, water has been regarded as a mineral") (quoting Charlestone Stone Products Co. v. Andrus,
553 F.2d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1977)). In Andrus, the court also noted that "the scientific division of
all matter into the animal, vegetable or mineral kingdom would be absurd as applied to a grant of
lands, since all lands belong to the mineral kingdom." Id.at 610 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903)).
193. Id at 610. The 1866 and 1870 laws intended to "approve and confirm the policy of appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the legislation and judicial
decisions of the arid-land states." Id at 613 (quoting Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement
Co., 295 U.S. 142,154-55 (1935)).
194. See, e.g., TARLOCK, supra note 107 § 5:8 (stating "Colorado and its arid neighbors rejected
the dual system" of the Pacific Coast states, thus, rejecting common law riparian rights with the rationale that the federal government silently acquiesced in rejecting them and after 1866 gave congressional consent to state control); see also Colorado v. Sw.Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 671 P.2d
1294 (Colo. 1983), cert.denied,466 U.S. 944 (1984).
195. For groundwater, some states follow the "English" or Absolute Ownership Rule of Capture
limiting use to owners of land overlying the groundwater. See, e.g., TARLOCK, supra note 107 § 4:6.
New Mexico and other states follow the American or Reasonable Use Rule. See id §§ 4.6-4.7, 6.10.
196. Id.§ 6:5; see also N.M. CONST. art. XVI § 2; 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 11.04(a) n.74
(Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds. 1991).
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Prior appropriation is "antiquated" because it "protects older and often
inefficient uses of water.'1 97 "The first-in-time, first-in-rightprinciple in
prior appropriation ensures that older uses, that may not be the best use
of water in current times, must be fully satisfied before newer uses can
be met."' 98
Although beneficial use is part of a prior appropriation model, New
Mexico case law has recognized "most uses as beneficial."' 199 Thus, a
prior appropriation system focuses on first-in-time, but does not necessarily consider the value of uses or encourage maximum benefit for the
most people. In addition, prior appropriation water rights are assigned
through litigation, and the "constant readjustment of rights" and "the
difficulty of binding all claimants ... makes it difficult if not impossible
' 200
to give decrees ...finality."
Consequently, a prior appropriation model may not be best for
wind rights. A first-in-time focus for wind rights might be problematic
because when wind developers map out a development area, they measure the intensity and regularity of winds. This varies depending on location, and some spots are better than others. Also, the economic feasibility of a project depends on a predicted electricity production that is
carefully calculated. If another wind developer puts turbines upwind,
these can impact downwind production efficiencies.20 1 This might be
especially problematic if the downwind wind farm has the potential for
greater generation capacities and is closer to transmission facilities.
Thus, it would benefit society and expend fewer resources to develop
the downwind farm, yet a prior appropriation regime would give the
upwind farm, less favorable site preference based simply on timing.
Second, New Mexico groundwater law assumes severance, recognizing "the separate and distinct nature of a water right" from ownership of the land.20 2 The sole exception to the severance assumption is
when water is used for irrigation because New Mexico has statutes explicitly restricting severance in those situations.20 3 While severance of a
197. Adell Amos, Freshwater Conservation in the Context of Energy and Climate Policy: Assessing ProgressandIdentifying Challenges in Oregon and the Western United States, 12 U. DENY.
WATER L. REV. 1, 133 (2008).
198. Id.
199. 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 831 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds. 1991). Excessive diversion is one of the only non-beneficial uses. See id. at 832 (citing Jicarilla Apache Tribe v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1981)).
200. TARLOCK, supra note 107, § 7:2.
201. See Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Fourto Allocate Wind
Rights,46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 209 (2009) ("If turbines are built at both sites, the wake from [the
upwind site] turbine will disrupt winds flowing to [the downwind site], rendering [the downwind site]
unprofitable.").
202. Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d 882, 888 (N.M. 2007); see also WATERS, supra note 199, at
79 (Supp. 2008).
203. Walker, 162 P.3d at 889 (citing N.M. STAT. § 72-1-2 (2007) ("[W]ater that is applied to irrigation becomes appurtenant to the land.")). Prior to 2007, New Mexico courts also considered water
rights appurtenant to land when use of water on the land is indispensable to the land's enjoyment,
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subsurface resource, such as water, may have minimal impacts on the
value of a surface estate, this article has already addressed the problem
of applying underground resource analogies in the context of wind
that
power development. 2° Wind power requires extensive surface use
20 5
makes coexistence with competing surface uses more problematic.
However, by rejecting an oil analogy for wind and turning instead
to a water model as an alternative, New Mexico appears to be moving in
the right direction because it brings wind closer to solar analogies. New
Mexico is one of only two states in the country that analogizes solar
rights to water rights and by statute created a prior appropriation system
for administering solar rights.2 °6
There is one important distinction, however, between New Mexico's prior appropriation water regime and its prior appropriation regime for solar rights. While water is presumed to be severable, solar
rights in New Mexico are "appurtenant to the real property upon which
the solar collector is situated., 20 7 Therefore, applying New Mexico's solar rights regime would eliminate one of the key impediments to wind
development discussed throughout this article-the problem of severance.
V. CONCLUSION

Only a handful of state legislatures have addressed wind ownership
issues,2U8 and even fewer have recognized and explicitly restricted wind
severance.209 Without legislative guidance, courts logically turn to
precedents defining the status of other resources, such as oil or water,
for analogies. Yet, defaulting to traditional models is unlikely to encourage the best development of our country's wind resources.
but that exception was refuted in Walker. Id.at 892-93; see also WATERS, supra note 199, at 79
(Supp. 2008).
204. See discussion supra Part III.B.
205. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicts between wind development and other surface uses).
206. N.M. STAT. §§ 47-3-1 to 47-3-5 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-103 (2009); see Debora S.

Grout, Access to Sunlight: New Mexico's Solar Rights Act, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957 (1979). But
cf Adrian J.Bradbrook, Future Directions in Solar Access Protection, 19 ENvTL. L. 167, 179 (1988)
("The nature of sunlight and the development of solar access laws should be regarded as sui
generis.").
207. N.M. STAT. § 47-3-10 (2008). Although the solar rights are "freely transferable," under section 47-3-4(B)(3), only grandfathered transfers are allowed separate from land. Id § 47-3-10(B)(3).
208.

MINN. STAT. § 500.30(2) (Supp. 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-910 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §

105.905 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 700.35 (2001) ("[Wind or][r]enewable energy resource easements shall
run with the land benefited and burdened unless otherwise expressly stated therein."). Wisconsin
also has a statute that declares any subsequent structure or vegetative growth that interferes with the
functioning of a nearby solar or wind energy system to be a private nuisance. WIS. STAT. § 844.22
(2007).
209. Explicit restrictions on severance: N.D. CENT. CODE § 17-04-04 (Supp. 2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 43-13-19 (2004) ("No interest... associated with the production or potential production of energy from wind power on the tract of land may be severed from the surface estate ...
except that such rights may be leased for a period not to exceed fifty years.").
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Without a legislative restriction, property law appears to allow severance of wind in a manner comparable to mineral severance. While
some mineral models may be appropriate for resources developed underground, time has proved false the assumption that everything that
happens below ground can stay below ground without impacting the
surface.2 10 Wind farms require long-term and extensive use of land, not
only on the surface, but also immediately above and below the surface
for transmission, distribution, and collection lines. As a result, wind development needs careful consideration to coordinate it with other surface and subsurface uses.
Furthermore, a specific analogy with oil extraction is problematic
because applying the common law rule of capture to wind may cause
wasteful development as it did with oil until legislatures introduced
mechanisms to adjust the deficiencies of the common law model. 21' An
analogy to water also carries with it the baggage and deficiencies of the
prior appropriation system. Progress toward treating wind rights in a
manner similar to solar rights may be a step in the right direction. However, few states have effective solar right regimes, and the distinctions
between wind and solar suggest that wind rights are
best addressed by
212
legislation specifically catered to wind development.
More importantly, yesterday's models cannot provide the best solutions for today's energy needs. Too long we have clung to our dependence on fossil fuels, such as coal and oil, and have resisted change even
in the face of increasing evidence that this fossil fuel focus has led us to
the brink of a worldwide crisis of climate change.
Instead of applying past regimes to wind, elected officials should
study these models for pitfalls to avoid. Future legislation should be tailored to the unique issues raised in developing each specific alternative
renewable resource. By taking a proactive approach, we can hope to
convert inefficient practices of the past into the productive alternative
energy solutions of our future.

210. Most scientists now view all natural systems as interrelated and subject to severe disruption
by human interference. See, e.g., International Development Research Center, Toward Sustainability, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-82309-201-1-DOTOPIC.html (last visited Oct. 12,2009).
211. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
212. When placed on vacant land, solar collectors represent a more intensive use of the surface
because they take up the full area rather than being spaced as with wind turbines. However, when
placed on roofs of existing buildings, solar collectors may be more amenable than wind rights to concurrent use.

